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In 2010, New Yorkers voted on electronic, optical-scan voting machines for the first time. Citizens 
went to their polling places on Election Day, filled out paper ballots and fed them into the brand-new 
optical scan machines. 
But tens of thousands of their votes did not count. Specifically, about 20,000 voters in New York State 
did not have their votes for governor counted because the machines read their choices as “overvotes” – 
the invalid selection of more than one candidate. Even more votes were lost in other contests – 30,000 
to 40,000 more. In a presidential year, with nearly twice the turnout, we expect that the number of 
votes lost because of overvoting would more than double, possibly resulting in more than 100,000 
lost votes.
In modern history, New York has never seen so many lost votes due to overvoting. Unlike the new 
optical scan voting system, New York’s old lever machines did not allow overvoting. But even so, the 
numbers of lost votes due to overvoting in 2010 were far greater than they should have been. Overvotes 
are almost always unintentional. A well-functioning voting system, even one that includes optical scan 
equipment, should have overvote rates very close to zero.
A great irony of this new problem is that the federal mandate to purchase new machines was specifically 
meant to reduce overvotes nationwide. Tens of thousands of votes were voided as overvotes in 2000, in 
places like Florida on punch card and other voting systems. The Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”), passed 
by Congress in 2002, requires that new voting systems used in polling places in United States must:3
(i) notify the voter [when she] has selected more than one candidate for a single office  
on the ballot;
(ii) notify the voter before the ballot is cast and counted of the effect of casting multiple  
votes for the office; and
(iii) provide the voter with the opportunity to correct the ballot before the ballot is  
cast and counted.
The Brennan Center, NAACP New York State Conference and other civil rights and good government 
groups have argued that New York’s overvote protections did not satisfy these requirements and predicted 
in a lawsuit filed in 2010 that these inadequate protections would lead to such high overvote rates.4 
Specifically, they pointed to a message voters would see if the machine could not discern the voter’s intent; 
the groups argued this message would confuse voters, making it more likely they would cast invalid votes, 
and less likely that they would correct their ballots to ensure they were accurately counted.5 
As we demonstrate in this paper, the lack of adequate overvote protections had a disproportionately negative 
impact on the state’s poorest communities. Lost votes due to overvoting occurred far more frequently in 
areas with higher populations of low-income residents, people of color, and immigrants. Black and Hispanic 
voters were at least twice as likely to lose votes due to overvoting as non-Hispanic whites. Shockingly, in two 
Bronx election districts, nearly 40 percent of the votes cast for governor were voided as overvotes.
I. Executive Summary
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The good news is that the New York State Board of Elections has agreed to adopt a better overvote 
warning when a voting machine cannot discern voter intent, hopefully in time for the November 2012 
election: such a warning will inform the voter of the problem in plain English (“you have filled in too 
many ovals”), and clearly explain the consequences of casting an overvote (“your vote will not count”). 
The new message can be found in Appendix A of this report. 
This should significantly reduce the number of overvotes in 2012, but it will not eliminate the problem. 
There is more that our public officials, and especially our state legislators, could do.  In this report, we 
discuss how commonsense solutions, like requiring boards of elections to publish precinct-level election 
results, can improve detection and correction of machine-related problems. Critically, we also explore 
how better ballot design requirements can reduce overvotes.
Finally, we examine the national implications of our findings in New York.
A. Core Findings from Examination of 2010 Data
New York’s new voting systems record election totals, including overvotes, by election district. The 
analysis in this report is in large part derived from our examination of that data, which was produced 
by local boards of elections in New York City and a number of other New York counties in response to 
discovery requests filed by the Brennan Center in connection with litigation about the voting machine 
overvote messages in New York.6 The data provided by the City7 and other counties, as well as additional 
research and analysis by Brennan Center staff, led us to several important findings:
For the first time in 2010, tens of thousands of New Yorkers’ votes were disqualified for 
overvoting.
•	 Statewide, we estimate about 20,000 votes were lost in the governor’s contest alone, with 
between 50,000 and 60,000 overvotes in all contests.8 Absent remedial action, we could 
expect these numbers to more than double, with well over 100,000 disqualified overvotes in a 
presidential year.9
•	 In New York City alone, we estimate there were well over 6,500 lost votes resulting from 
overvotes in the governor’s contest, and close to 20,000 overvotes in all contests. 
•	 These overvote numbers far exceed what should be expected from a well-functioning voting 
system. Tens of thousands of votes were unintentionally lost.
Polling places with high concentrations of poor residents and language minorities had the highest 
overvote rates. 
•	 Across New York City, black and Hispanic voters were more than twice as likely as non-
Hispanic white voters to have votes voided as a result of overvoting. We estimate about 1 in 
100 black and Hispanic voters in New York City lost their vote for governor due to overvoting. 
Hispanic voters had the highest overvote rates in the City.
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•	 Election districts in neighborhoods with high immigrant populations, such as Chinatown, 
Jackson Heights and Brighton Beach, also had exceptionally high numbers of voided overvotes. 
These neighborhoods are home to significant numbers of language minority voters.
•	 Overvote rates in the governor’s race were highest in the Bronx; nearly 1 percent of all 
gubernatorial votes in the Bronx were not counted because of overvotes. The areas with the 
highest overvote rates were concentrated in low-income and predominantly Hispanic sections 
of Mott Haven and Port Morris. Two election districts in the South Bronx had overvote rates 
of close to 40 percent.
New York City and other counties in New York State are not fully leveraging information provided 
by voting machines to ensure that all intended votes are counted.
•	 As of this writing, we are aware of only one county in the entire state – Rockland County – that 
publishes overvote data by election district.
•	 Even when responding to discovery requests during litigation, New York City was unable 
to produce precinct-level data for more than half of all election districts in Queens and 
Brooklyn. The election districts for which the City could not produce overvote data had 
disproportionately high concentrations of non-white voters. Of the 57 counties outside New 
York City, 28 counties failed to produce requested overvote data at all.
•	 Overvote data can alert election officials and the public to potential problems with voting 
machines, poll worker training, or voter education. For example, in 2010, the New York City 
polling place with the highest overvote rates was located in the Port Morris neighborhood of 
the South Bronx. The six election districts with the highest overvote rates in the City were all 
located in this polling place, with more than 1 in 5 votes lost in the governor’s contest due to 
overvoting. This indicates a serious problem that warrants investigation. 
 
Poor Ballot Design Will Lead to More Overvotes
•	 Data from New York City suggests that a confusing ballot design led to many hundreds of extra 
overvotes. Consider the two separate U.S. Senate elections that were both on the 2010 ballot. 
In Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand’s contest, the candidates were listed over two rows. By contrast, 
candidates in Sen. Schumer’s contest were listed across just one row. There were more than 
twice as many overvotes in Sen. Gillibrand’s contest as in Sen. Schumer’s contest.
•	 The contests for governor and for Sen. Gillibrand’s seat had the two highest overvote rates in New 
York City. These were the only two contests where the candidates were listed over two rows.
•	 The basic problem with current ballot design requirements is that they were drafted for lever 
machines. New York’s ballots are a paper representation of the lever machines, but the 
new optical scan machines do not have nearly the level of overvote protection of lever 
machines (which did not allow overvotes). 
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•	 The results in this report reaffirm the connection, established in several national studies, 
between poor ballot design and higher overvote rates. 10
The Problems in New York Have National Implications
• Recent elections in other states like Florida and Ohio show us how poor ballot design, 
combined with inadequate overvote protections, continue to result in many thousands 
of lost votes, a decade after the 2000 election debacle and the passage of HAVA. 
•	 As in New York, the poor and racial and ethnic minorities in other parts of the country have 
been most impacted when these problems are not adequately addressed.
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B. Recommendations to Further Reduce Overvotes
As already discussed, New York has agreed to adopt a new overvote message for its voting machines, 
hopefully in time for the 2012 elections. But even with this improvement on the way, there is more 
that should be done, particularly in the state legislature, to reduce overvotes and address other election 
problems. New York can take steps to ensure that election administrators and the public are able 
to monitor data provided by New York’s new voting machines and address problems that can lead 
to disenfranchisement at the polling place.  And the state legislature must modify ballot design 
requirements, which make ballots difficult to read and lead to voter error.
While these recommendations are specific to New York, they are just as important nationally.  This is 
discussed in greater detail at 23-26.
1. Require Publication of Regular Reports of Election Day Data by Election District
 
New York’s voting machines allow election officials to collect and publish vote totals by election district, 
including overvotes and undervotes, but many jurisdictions don’t publish these election district-level 
numbers. Given the high levels of overvotes recorded in 2010, we recommend that New York follow 
practices adopted by the state of Florida, such as requiring: (1) all counties to report election totals, 
including numbers of overvotes, by precinct, and (2) the state to issue, after every federal election, a 
report assessing voting system performance and administrative procedures based upon that data. We 
believe such a reporting system would allow state and local election officials to quickly identify and 
correct the kinds of issues that may have led to the exceptionally high overvote rates in election districts 
in places like the Port Morris and Mott Haven sections of the South Bronx in 2010.
2.  Mandate State and Local Action to Address Problems Discovered From  
Election District Reports
Where problems are found, the state and local boards of elections should be required and empowered 
to address them. For instance, if there are high overvote rates in election districts where many voters 
have limited English proficiency, local boards should investigate the reasons for the high overvote rates. 
When necessary, local boards could educate translators, monitors, and machine attendants who work 
at those election districts about overvoting and its causes. 
3. Provide Public Access to Ballots
Better overvote notification in 2012 should make it more likely that voters will correct their ballots 
when the machines cannot read them. But to effectively reduce overvoting, public advocates who 
interact with voters must have the tools to understand why overvotes are happening in the first instance. 
That means treating ballots as public records—as they are in so many states11—so that members of the 
public and voting experts can review overvoted ballots to determine why those ballots may have been 
overvoted.  Moreover, as noted on page 11 of this report, overvotes can sometimes be caused by a 
machine or procedural error and a review of the paper ballot could show there was, in fact, no overvote. 
New York law currently allows review of ballots only under very limited circumstances.12 There is no 
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provision in the law for members of the general public, academics, or public advocacy groups to review 
paper ballots.
4. Improve New York’s Ballot Design Requirements
The Brennan Center has previously determined New York’s election code and regulations violate 
several basic usability principles.13 This makes it more difficult for election officials to design usable 
ballots and more likely that voters will make mistakes like overvoting when casting their ballots. To 
reduce overvoting, New York should re-examine its ballot requirements and give election officials more 
guidance and greater flexibility to design user-friendly ballots. For instance, New York ought to give 
election officials enough flexibility to design ballots so they display all candidates for each contest across 
one row, even when there are more than eight candidates and parties for that contest. This will obviate 
the need for candidates in a particular contest to be displayed across multiple rows of the ballot, a ballot 
design flaw that is a primary cause of overvoting. State election law could also be amended to encourage 
election officials to use borders and shading more effectively so that voters can more clearly distinguish 
one contest from another.
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Based on the data provided by New York City and 28 other counties, we estimate that approximately 
20,000 votes in the governor’s contest were lost due to overvoting statewide, with between 50,000 
and 60,000 overvoted contests in total.14
We further estimate that in New York City alone, there were over 6,500 overvotes cast on Election 
Day in the 2010 gubernatorial contest.15 In total, for all of the election contests, we estimate that 
there were at least 18,958 overvotes during Election Day voting in the City. Appendix A to this 
report details the number of overvotes in each election contest in the City. We estimate that there were 
at least 1,000 overvotes in the City in every statewide election contest.
Figure 1 displays the overvote rates in the 2010 governor’s contest in each New York State county that 
maintains accessible overvote data. Several counties in New York State outside of New York City reported 
alarmingly high overvote rates, including Chemung, Cortland, Greene, Madison, Orange, Oswego, and 
Yates counties. All of these counties had overvote rates of 0.4% or more in just the governor’s contest. 
Other counties that we might expect to have had high overvote rates, including Erie, Monroe, Nassau and 
Westchester counties, either did not provide us with overvote information, or provided it in a format that 
made it impossible to calculate the aggregate overvote rate in a reasonable time.16 Those areas within New 
York State that are not color-coded represent the counties that did not provide accessible overvote data. 
Figure 1: Overvote rates in the 2010 governor’s contest, by county in New York State.
Unfortunately, even among the counties that provided data, few provided that information in an accessible 
format that would allow us to readily analyze data by election district. Accordingly, we have limited our 
detailed analysis of overvoting to New York City, which had the largest total number of overvotes of the 
jurisdictions that provided information (though Chemung, Greene, and Yates counties recorded higher 
overvote rates).
II. Overvoting in New York: An Overview of the Data
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Table 1 displays the total estimated number of overvotes in the 2010 gubernatorial general election in 
each New York City borough. 
Vote Totals From 
NYC Data
Overvote Rate 
from NYC Data
Total # of 
ED Votes
Estimated # of ED 
Overvotes
Bronx 172,985 0.90 percent 174,613 1,572
Brooklyn 183,200 0.51 percent 394,057 2,028
Manhattan 339,138 0.35 percent 341,778 1,188
Queens 153,849 0.42 percent 337,366 1,403
Staten Island 94,892 0.34 percent 94,993 322
Totals 944,064 0.49 percent 1,342,747 6,513
Table 1: Estimated number of election day overvotes in 2010 governor’s race, by borough. Vote Totals from NYC 
Data and Overvote Rate from NYC Data are taken from data provided by the New York City Board of Elections 
to the Brennan Center and Plaintiffs. Total Number of Election Day Votes is taken from New York State Board of 
Elections website. Estimated Number of Election Day Overvotes is calculated by multiplying Overvote Rate from 
NYC Data by the total number of machine votes cast on Election Day.
To illustrate just how high this number is, it is worth remembering that prior to 2010, there were 
virtually no overvotes on Election Day in New York, because the lever machines did not allow them. 
Even among jurisdictions that use optical scan voting machines, overvote rates should generally be at 
or close to zero. The federal Election Assistance Commission stopped collecting overvote data from 
counties in 2004. 17 But Professors David Kimball and Martha Kropf collected vote totals from every 
county in 2008 and included overvote data where available.  Of the 206 counties that used precinct 
count optical scans and provided overvote data in 2008, the median overvote rate was 0.12%. That is 
less than a quarter of the overvote rate in New York City in 2010, and less than one seventh the rate in 
the Bronx.18  
A. High Overvote Areas By New York City Borough
Figure 2 provides an overview of overvote rates across all five boroughs in the city. The figure displays 
in shades of blue those election districts with overvote rates in the gubernatorial election that were less 
than 1 percent. The red and orange election districts have the highest overvote rates in the city. 
III. Detailed Analysis of New York City Overvotes
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Figure 2: Overview of overvote rates in New York City, 2010 gubernatorial election. The black line at right 
represents the eastern edge of New York City; in areas within the city that are not color-coded, the City could 
not provide overvote data. 
Given that overvotes are almost always mistakes, overvote rates of more than 1 percent are deeply 
troubling. As Table 2 shows, nearly 20 percent of election districts in New York City saw such high 
overvote rates. In the controversial 2000 presidential election in Florida, the overvote rate was 1.8 
percent. Over 8.3 percent of election districts in New York City had overvote rates higher than 1.8 
percent. This is serious cause for concern. 
% of Precincts with 
Overvote Rate > 1%
Bronx 31.9%
Brooklyn 19.1%
Manhattan 12.0%
Queens 14.1%
Staten Island 10.1%
Total 18.3%
Table 2: Percentage of precincts with overvote rates greater than 1 percent, by New York City borough.
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1. High Overvote Districts: The Bronx
As Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 2 demonstrate, overvote rates in the governor’s contest were highest in the 
Bronx. Nearly 1 in 100 gubernatorial votes in the Bronx was not counted because it was an overvote. 
Figure 3: Overvote rates in 2010 gubernatorial election in the Bronx.  
Figure 3 above shows the level of overvoting by election district in the Bronx. Colors closer to blue 
indicate lower overvote rates, and colors closer to red indicate higher overvote rates. The figure indicates 
that the highest overvote rates were concentrated in the southern and eastern Bronx. Astoundingly, 
there were seven different election districts with more than 30 ballots cast where 10 percent or more 
of the voters lost their votes for governor due to overvoting. Six of these election districts were in a 
single polling place in the Bronx (see inset). The other was in the Morris Park neighborhood in the 
northeastern Bronx. 
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Investigating the Extraordinarily High 
Overvote Rates at P.S. 65 on 677 E 141 St.
Data produced by the City shows that the six election districts in New York City with the highest 
overvote rates were in one polling place – P.S. 65 on 677 East 141st Street in the South Bronx. In two 
of these election districts, more than one in three votes for governor were lost because of overvoting. 
Aggregating across all of these election districts, the overvote rate in the governor’s contest was 20.4 
percent. There were a staggering 170 overvotes in the gubernatorial election alone. No other polling 
location in New York City had a total overvote rate that was even half as high as the rate at this location. 
The voting-age population in these election districts was 73.7 percent Hispanic and 22.8 percent black. 
The large Hispanic population in these high overvote election districts suggests that voters with limited 
English proficiency might overvote at higher rates than the rest of the population.  
Figure 4: Overvote rate detail for election districts voting at P.S. 65 polling location in South Bronx. These 
election districts are concentrated in the Port Morris and Mott Haven neighborhoods. 
What is even more striking about these overvote numbers is that they were also extremely high in every 
other contest on the ballot; in most other election districts, the overvote rate for governor was far higher 
than for any other office. The table below provides the overvote rates for all contested elections on the 
ballot at this polling location. The consistently high overvote rate across contests suggests that there may 
have been a machine problem in this polling place: one or more of the machines may have incorrectly 
recorded overvotes, voiding substantial numbers of valid votes. On the other hand, it is possible that the 
data reported by the City is simply incorrect; this, too, would raise troubling questions. No matter the 
cause, these high numbers deserve an investigation and explanation. This investigation should not only 
assess what may have been wrong with the machines, but also whether poll workers were informed by 
large numbers of voters that they were getting error messages from the machines, and whether and how 
they responded.
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AD/
ED Gov Comp AG Sen6 Sen2 SCJust Cong SSen Assemb CCJ 
84/023 39.40% 33.30% 35.80% 38.60% 35.30% 31.30% 36.40% 22.70% 27.70% 33.90%
84/088 35.10% 31.60% 28.00% 28.60% 26.90% 27.00% 27.70% 26.50% 27.30% 32.30%
84/058 19.40% 25.00% 11.50% 17.90% 26.90% 18.50% 10.70% 14.80% 20.00% 28.00%
84/066 19.30% 17.90% 15.90% 15.00% 17.90% 16.60% 15.50% 16.20% 16.50% 14.50%
84/057 16.50% 13.50% 14.70% 13.00% 16.80% 13.70% 12.80% 13.00% 15.80% 13.10%
84/065 15.00% 13.30% 9.80% 11.80% 14.40% 10.50% 12.50% 11.50% 13.10% 11.50% 
AD/ED: Assembly  
District/Election District
Gov: Governor
Comp: Comptroller
AG: Attorney General
Sen6: Schumer Senate race
Sen2: Gillibrand Senate race
SCJust: Supreme Court Justice
Cong: Congressional
SSen: State Senate
Assemb: Assembly
CCJ: Civil Court Judge
Table 3: Precincts with highest overvote rates in New York City.  
All six vote at the P.S. 65 polling location in the South Bronx. 
The Brennan Center notified the City Board of its discovery of this potential voting system problem on 
October 6, 2011, and notified the State Board on October 7, suggesting that the problem should be 
investigated before the machines used at P.S. 65 in 2010 were used again.19 Despite our request to be 
kept informed, we are not aware of any investigation having yet been conducted.  Neither the City nor 
the State has indicated these machines would not be used in the 2011 general election. 
2. High Overvote Districts: Brooklyn
Figure 5 displays the overvote rates in the Brooklyn election districts for which overvote data was 
available. The City did not produce overvote data for 56.2 percent of the election districts in Brooklyn. 
The election districts for which overvote data was not available are not color-coded; they are represented 
using the gray background of the map. There are 1,065,000 people of voting-age in Brooklyn election 
districts for which overvote data was missing; 66.5 percent of that voting-age population is non-white. 
By contrast, just 59.1 percent of the voting-age population in election districts with available overvote 
data was non-white. This suggests that election districts where overvote data was not available have 
much higher concentrations of minority voters.
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Figure 5: Overvote rates in 2010 governor’s contest in Brooklyn election districts.  
Gray areas in Brooklyn represent election districts for which overvote data was not available. 
Among those election districts for which the City did produce overvote data, there were 11 with more 
than 30 voters in which more than 5 percent of voters lost their votes in the governor’s contest due to 
overvoting. Table 4 details the gubernatorial overvote rate in each of these precincts. 
AD/ED Overvote Rate 
for Governor
Neighborhood White 
VAP %
Black 
VAP %
Hispanic 
VAP %
Asian 
VAP %
55/085 11.8% Brownsville 0.5% 67.6% 29.6% 0.9%
55/092 8.7% Brownsville 0.3% 68.6% 28.2% 0.7%
55/093 8.5% Brownsville 0.3% 68.6% 28.2% 0.7%
55/097 7.9% Brownsville 0.8% 71.8% 25.3% 1.0%
56/041 6.8% Bedford-Stuyvesant 7.9% 80.5% 7.0% 2.2%
56/032 6.5% Bedford-Stuyvesant 9.2% 73.2% 8.5% 3.9%
55/095 6.1% Brownsville 1.2% 64.4% 33.5% 0%
46/051 5.9% Brighton Beach 90.3% 0.5% 6.3% 2.3%
56/043 5.6% Bedford-Stuyvesant 2.4% 86.6% 7.8% 1.9%
55/096 5.4% Brownsville 0.8% 72.5% 25.0% 6.3%
56/073 5.2% Bedford-Stuyvesant 0.5% 91.3% 6.3% 1.1%
Table 4: Election Districts in Brooklyn with overvote rates greater than 5 percent in the governor’s contest. 
Only includes election districts with more than thirty voters. VAP percent columns show the percentage of the 
voting-age population by race in each election district, based on the 2010 Census.
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Ten of these election districts were located in the Bedford-Stuyvesant and Brownsville neighborhoods. 
The Brownsville districts – all in Assembly District 55 – are concentrated entirely within the Tilden, 
Brownsville and Van Dyke housing projects located just east of Rockaway Avenue in Brownsville. The 
precinct with the highest overvote rate in Brooklyn in the governor’s contest – 11.8 percent – is located 
in this cluster of housing projects. The Brownsville election districts have a very large concentration of 
people of color: the cumulative voting-age population in the Brownsville districts is 55.1 percent black 
and 80.6 percent non-white, suggesting that black and other minority voters are at greater risk for 
overvoting. The only election district outside Brownsville and Bedford-Stuyvesant that has an overvote 
rate greater than 5 percent – 46/051 – is located in immigrant-heavy Brighton Beach. 
Figure 6: Overvote rates in 2010 governor’s election, Bedford-Stuyvesant and Brownsville in Brooklyn. 
While Figure 6 provides some indication of the severity of the overvoting problem in Brownsville, it is 
equally informative in what it does not show. Just as in Figure 5, only part of the map is color-coded 
with overvote rates. The rest – displayed using the standard gray of the street map – represents areas 
where the City did not produce overvote data.  
As shown in Figure 6, many of these “gray” areas in Brooklyn are adjacent to high overvote election 
districts; for instance, there is no overvote data on any of the blocks directly south or west of the high 
overvote areas in Brownsville areas or on the blocks directly north of the high overvote areas in Bedford-
Stuyvesant. We expect that some of these areas could have high overvote rates, too. 
Unlike some of the high overvote election districts in the Bronx, the high overvote districts in Brooklyn 
did not have consistently high overvote rates across all contests. In fact, the overvote rates in nearly 
every other contest are much lower than in the governor’s race. It is worth noting, however, that the 
election district with the highest overvote rate in the Supreme Court contest had an astounding 18.1 
percent overvote rate; in fact, there were three election districts – 55/082, 55/095 and 56/043 - which 
had overvote rates above 10 percent for the Supreme Court contest. All three were located in the 
Bedford-Stuyvesant and Brownsville neighborhoods shown in Figure 6. 
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3. High Overvote Rate Districts: Manhattan
Figure 7 illustrates the overvote rates in Manhattan election districts. Nearly all of the election districts 
in lower and midtown Manhattan have overvote rates below 1 percent. Most of the borough’s high 
overvote election districts are concentrated in the Washington Heights, Harlem, and East Harlem 
neighborhoods in upper Manhattan. 
Figure 7: Overvote rates in Manhattan election districts.
Table 5 describes the five Manhattan election districts with the highest overvote rates. Manhattan’s 
first and third highest overvote rates are in adjacent election districts in East Harlem, covering the 
blocks between 110th and 113th Street between Third and Park Avenues. These election districts are 
displayed in Figure 4 on page 11, which also displayed the high overvote election districts in the south 
Bronx. Across these two election districts, more than one in every twenty ballots cast were not counted 
because of overvoting. The voting-age population in these two districts was 55.5 percent Hispanic, 25.0 
percent black and just 9.6 percent white. Again, the demographic makeup of the high overvote election 
districts suggests that people of color might be more likely to overvote than whites. The high number 
of Hispanics in these districts, as in the South Bronx, suggests that people for whom English is a second 
language may have particularly high overvote rates.  
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AD/ED Overvote Rate  
for Governor
Neighborhood White VAP 
%
Black  
VAP %
Hispanic 
VAP %
Asian  
VAP %
68/051 6.4% East Harlem 20.0% 15.9% 51.3% 10.1%
71/096 4.8% Washington 
Heights
4.1% 18.0% 76.8% 0.3%
68/073 4.3% East Harlem 1.0% 32.6% 59.0% 6.1%
68/112 3.8% East Harlem 2.0% 33.8% 58.3% 3.9%
74/033 3.8% East Village 12.3% 15.0% 51.2% 19.9%
Table 5: The five election districts with the highest overvote rates in Manhattan. Only includes  
election districts with more than thirty voters. VAP % columns show the percentage of the 
voting-age population by race in each election district, based on the 2010 census.
Outside of the Harlem and East Harlem neighborhoods, there is one other Manhattan neighborhood 
with consistently high overvote rates: Chinatown. Though none of the election districts in Chinatown 
are among the borough’s top five in overvote rates, there are nine different election districts in 
Chinatown and the neighborhoods directly south of it with overvote rates above 1 percent as well as 
majority Asian voting-age populations. The high number of Asian voters in these election districts, as 
with Hispanics in the South Bronx and East Harlem, reaffirms our conclusion that voters with limited 
English proficiency may have very high overvote rates. This is true even though voters in areas with 
high numbers of language minorities in New York City have the option of receiving messages from the 
machine in Spanish, Chinese or Korean, and indicates just how important it is to ensure the availability 
of good translators at the polls. 
4. High Overvote Districts: Queens
Figure 8 provides an overview of the geographic distribution of high overvote rates across Queens. 
The black lines in the figure outline the boundaries of the borough; as in Figure 5, the regions that are 
not color-coded in Queens represent election districts for which the City failed to produce overvote 
data. As in Brooklyn, the City failed to produce overvote data for more than half – 56 percent – of the 
election districts in Queens. The missing data include many election districts we might expect to have 
high overvote rates. For instance, the City was unable to provide overvote data for the South Jamaica 
and Jamaica Gardens neighborhoods in Queens: people of color, who are more likely to lose votes to 
overvoting – as we demonstrate in subsequent sections of this report – make up more than 90 percent 
of the voting-age population in several clusters of election districts in both neighborhoods. Indeed, the 
Queens election districts for which the City could not produce overvote data contain 852,131 people 
of voting age, and 74.7 percent of that population is non-white. By comparison, in election districts 
with available overvote data, just 66 percent of the voting-age population was non-white. In other 
words, the election districts where overvote data was not available have much higher concentrations of 
minority voters. 
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Figure 8: High overvote rates in Queens election districts. Black lines indicate outer boundaries  
of Queens; non-color-coded regions in Queens represent election districts without overvote data.  
Even within the limited sample of data provided by the City, there were a number of election districts 
with very high overvote rates. Table 6 lists the five Queens election districts with the highest overvote 
rates in the governor’s contest.
AD/ED
Overvote Rate 
for Governor Neighborhoods
White 
VAP %
Black VAP 
%
Hispanic 
VAP %
Asian VAP 
%
35/028 4.6% Rego Park 27.5% 7.6% 20.1% 40.9%
22/008 3.6% Flushing 14.9% 1.7% 18.2% 64.9%
22/003 3.3% Flushing 3.9% 15.1% 18.9% 60.9%
34/046 2.7% Jackson Heights 2.5% 2.0% 84.7% 10.1%
35/044 2.7% LeFrak City 5.4% 0.8% 23.3% 67.6%
Table 6: Five election districts with highest overvote rates in Queens. Only includes election  
districts with more than thirty voters. VAP percent columns show the percentage of the voting-age 
population by race in each election district, based on the 2010 Census.
The highest overvote districts in Queens are concentrated in immigrant-heavy neighborhoods like East 
Flushing, Jackson Heights and Rego Park. Over 70 percent of the voting-age population in all five of 
the election districts in Table 6 is non-white. The voting-age population in the second, third and fifth of 
the election districts listed in Table 6 is more than 60 percent Asian. Once again, voters in immigrant-
heavy communities seem to be more likely to overvote. This reaffirms the importance of having good 
translators who can assist voters the polls.
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5. High Overvote Districts: Staten Island
Among the City’s five boroughs, Staten Island had the lowest overvote rates. Nonetheless, with a borough-
wide overvote rate of 0.34 percent in the governor’s contest, and with 1 in 10 districts reporting overvote 
rates exceeding 1 percent, overvoting was still all too common in Staten Island. Figure 9 shows the 
geographic distribution of overvoting across Staten Island election districts. Election districts with overvote 
rates above 1 percent were scattered throughout the borough. However, as the figure demonstrates, high-
overvote election districts were concentrated in the West New Brighton neighborhood to the north and 
the Bull’s Head and Old Town neighborhoods in the middle of the island.
Figure 9: Overvote rates in Staten Island election districts.
Table 7 lists the five election districts in Staten Island with the highest overvote rates in the governor’s 
contest. The election district with the borough’s highest overvote rate appears to be a gross anomaly; its 
overvote rate was more than twice the overvote rate in any other election district in Staten Island. That 
election district, shown in orange in Figure 9, is located in the Old Town neighborhood; the voting-age 
population is 79.7 percent white. The second, fourth and fifth districts shown in Table 7 are located in 
the low-income West New Brighton neighborhood; in all three, the voting-age population is over 70 
percent non-white, with an approximately equal cumulative number of blacks and Hispanics. 
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AD/ED Overvote Rate in 
Governor’s Contest
Neighborhoods White 
VAP %
Black 
VAP %
Hispanic 
VAP %
Asian 
VAP %
60/024 9.2% Old Town 79.7% 0.6% 11.0% 7.2%
61/051 4.1% West New Brighton 6.9% 52.2% 35.4% 2.1%
63/008 2.8% Grasmere 68.5% 2.7% 14.4% 13.3%
61/086 2.1% West New Brighton 28.1% 17.2% 40.1% 13.1%
61/044 2.0% West New Brighton 17.4% 41.4% 33.9% 4.9%
Table 6: Five election districts with highest overvote rates in Staten Island. Only includes election districts with 
more than thirty voters. VAP % columns show the percentage of the voting-age population by race in each 
election district, based on the 2010 Census.
B. Estimating New York City Overvote Rates by Race 
We know how many overvotes were cast in each election district for which New York City provided 
information. We also know the voting-age population, by race, in each of these election districts. From 
this data, we can gain some sense of how black, Hispanic and non-Hispanic white New Yorkers were 
impacted by the overvote error message used in 2010.20
The analysis of high overvote areas in New York City suggested that people of color were more likely to 
overvote. Using a statistical technique known as ecological inference, we can more rigorously estimate 
overvoting patterns for blacks and Hispanics in four of the five boroughs.21 Appendix C describes our 
methodology in greater detail; the appendix also provides the 95 percent confidence intervals associated 
with our estimates. Table 7 provides the results of the ecological inference analysis; the table estimates 
the overvote rate among actual voters.
White Black Hispanic
Bronx 0.55% 1.08% 1.28% 
Brooklyn 0.35% 0.63% 1.37% 
Manhattan 0.20% 0.82% 0.91% 
Queens 0.24% 0.64% 1.37% 
Staten Island 0.21% *** ***
Table 7: Estimated overvote rates by race and borough, gubernatorial election 2010. 
In the four boroughs for which it was possible to make accurate inferences about blacks and Hispanics, 
we estimate that black and Hispanic voters overvoted at significantly higher rates than white 
voters. The lone exception is in Queens, where the difference between black and white overvote rates 
is not statistically significant because the size of the black population is small and thus increases our 
uncertainty with respect to the black overvote estimate. Nonetheless, Hispanic voters in Queens are still 
much more likely to overvote than white voters.
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In the Bronx and Brooklyn, the black overvote rate is nearly double the white overvote rate, and in 
Manhattan, it is more than quadruple the white overvote rate. The Hispanic overvote rate is more than 
double the white overvote rate in the Bronx, about quadruple the white overvote rate in Brooklyn and 
Manhattan, and more than five times the white overvote rate in Queens. 
All of this suggests that the inability of the overvote error message to deter overvoting may have placed 
a disproportionate burden on people of color. 
Table 3 also indicates that Hispanic voters are consistently more likely to overvote than even black 
voters. The difference between Hispanic and black overvote rates in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens 
is statistically significant. Though the Hispanic overvote rate is greater than the black overvote rate in 
Manhattan, the high level of uncertainty about the black overvote rate precludes us from concluding 
that the difference is statistically significant. Nonetheless, the high Hispanic overvote rate in all four 
boroughs suggests that language barriers might make it more likely that Hispanic voters will overvote. 
Perhaps language assistance is not readily available for some Spanish-speaking voters, or perhaps 
the overvote error message given in Spanish was not clear for these voters. Our results appear to be 
symptomatic of unremediated election administration problems that have made Hispanic voters more 
likely to have their ballots discarded. 
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Several studies have shown that confusing ballot design can lead to errors. In particular, splitting 
candidates for the same office onto different rows can lead to overvotes.22 This was what happened in 
the Gillibrand senate contest in 2010. Unlike the Schumer senate contest, which was also on the ballot, 
the Gillibrand contest ran over two rows.
Unsurprisingly, there were many more overvotes in the Gillibrand contest: 3,350 in New York City, 
compared to just 1,567 in the Schumer contest. While we did not conduct a statewide analysis of lost 
votes in this contest, if the same pattern applied as in the governor’s contest, this could easily mean there 
were over 10,000 lost votes statewide in the Gillibrand contest due to overvoting. Undoubtedly, 
many of the overvotes in Sen. Gillibrand’s contest came from voters filling out ovals in both the first 
and second rows.
IV. The Impact of Ballot Design on Overvoting in the Gillibrand Senate Contest
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The only other contest on the New York City ballot with candidates listed over two rows was the 
governor’s contest, which saw the highest overvote rates in the City.
This suggests that if the state hopes to further reduce overvoting, it should amend ballot design 
requirements to allow election officials to (1) place all candidates and parties in a single row, even when 
there are more than eight of them and (2) use borders and shading more effectively so that voters can 
more clearly distinguish one contest from another.
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New York in 2010 was not alone among jurisdictions where inadequate overvote protections failed to 
save votes. Across the country, inadequate overvote protections have contributed to the loss of hundreds 
of thousands votes in recent years. Frequently, the poor and racial, ethnic and language minorities are 
impacted the most.
Bad ballot design continues to plague elections; it results in tens, and frequently hundreds, of thousands 
of lost votes in nearly every federal election.23 The Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”), passed in 
2002, was intended, in part, to help ameliorate the consequences of bad ballot design by providing a 
“technological fix” for this issue: overvote protection.  
HAVA’s mandate for overvote protection and the purchase of new voting technology contributed to a 
national reduction in overvotes. 24  But not all jurisdictions are doing equally well in reducing lost votes 
due to overvoting. 
 
The plaintiffs in NAACP New York State Conference v. New York State Board of Elections alleged that New 
York did not fully satisfy HAVA’s requirements for adequate overvote notification. 25 As predicted, there 
were tens of thousands more lost votes due to overvoting than there should have been. A review of 
overvote data and overvote protection practices from around the country shows that New York is not 
alone. In Florida in 2008, 13 counties used the same overvote protections and machines as were used in 
New York in 2010. The result in Florida was the same as in New York: dramatically higher overvote rates, 
with over 12,000 overvotes in the presidential contest alone.26  More than one in every 200 people who 
cast their votes in these counties on Election Day lost their votes for president.27  This was a rate five times 
greater than the rest of the State, where better overvote protections existed.28  
Moreover, as in New York, racial and ethnic minorities were disproportionately harmed by the lack 
of adequate overvote protections.  For instance, it is estimated that in Miami-Dade County, Hispanic 
voters were more than 50% likely to lose votes due to overvoting than non-Hispanic Whites, while 
African-American voters were more than five times as likely to lose votes for this reason.29
Similarly, several counties in Ohio in 2010 saw overvote rates of over 0.5% in the governor’s contests; 
in other words, more than one in 200 voters lost their votes due to ovevoting.30  The high overvote rate 
was partly the consequence of confusing instructions for the governor’s contest; the ballot stated, “select 
the joint candidates of your choice,” and may have caused some voters to believe they could vote for 
more than one candidate for governor.31 But for many who overvoted on Election Day, the “warning” 
message they received from the voting system probably did not help ensure that they corrected their 
ballots.
V. The National Significance of Inadequate Overvote Protections
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It is easy to see how this message could confuse voters into voiding their votes by pressing the “Accept” 
button.  The message does not tell the voter what she is “accepting” or that as a consequence of pressing 
“Accept,” she will lose her vote.
Most counties in Ohio do not publish data on overvotes.  But by examining the six counties that did 
so for the 2010 election, we can discern the negative impact of inadequate overvote protections.  In 
Allen, Clermont, Cuyahoga, and Lawrence counties, all of which used similar overvote messages and 
procedures, the overvote rates for voters who voted by mail (with no overvote protection) and those 
who voted on voting machines were similar. In other words, it seems the “overvote protection” afforded 
by these voting machines did little to actually reduce the overvote rate on Election Day.
Ohio County
Election Day 
Overvote Rate 
2010 Gov. Race
Absentee Overvote 
rate in 2010 Gov. 
Race
Lawrence 1.19% 1.09%
Allen 0.78% 1.01%
Cuyahoga 0.53% 0.57%
By contrast, Hamilton and Williams counties in Ohio used a different machine, with a different message 
and overvote procedure. 
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The overvote rates for voters who voted on Election Day in these counties was dramatically lower 
than for those who voted by mail without the overvote protections offered by a voting machine. The 
improved overvote protections also resulted in lower Election Day overvote rates than in Lawrence, 
Allen, Cuyahoga and Clermont counties.
Ohio County
Election Day 
Overvote Rate 
2010 Gov. Race
Absentee 
Overvote rate in 
2010 Gov. Race
Hamilton 0.23% 0.47%
Williams 0.14% 0.74%
In contrast to the other Ohio counties, the overvote rate for ballots cast on machines in Hamilton 
County was less than 50% of what it was for absentee ballots, and in Williams County, the rate for 
machine cast ballots was less than 20% what it was for absentee ballots. There are likely many factors 
which led to lower overvote rates in these counties, but the plain language in the message (“ballot is not 
properly marked”; “to make changes, pull ballot”) would certainly have helped. 
As in Florida and New York, the lack of good overvote protections appears to have disproportionately 
impacted racial minorities. An analysis provided by Professor Kimball and annexed to this report as 
Appendix F shows that African-Americans were approximately three times as likely as non-African 
Americans to lose their votes due to overvoting in Cuyahoga County in 2010 . More than one in one-
hundred African Americans lost their vote for governor due to overvoting in 2010.
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It is impossible to know the total national impact of poor overvote protections in the United States. 
The Election Assistance Commission no longer asks jurisdictions to provide overvote data. Nor do most 
states.  
Still, as the recent examples of Florida, Ohio and New York show, overvoting remains a significant 
problem in some jurisdictions. And the limited additional data we have tells us the problem is not 
confined to these three states. Professors Kimball and Kropf collected overvote data from at least a few 
counties in 8 different states in 2008. In 4 of them (Illinois, Arkansas, Florida and Iowa) at least one 
county had overvote rates of more than 0.4% in the presidential contest, with East St. Louis County, 
Illinois reporting the highest rate at 1.37%.32  
The solutions for these problems are largely the same as they are in New York: 
1.	 Clearer and more accessible overvote protections on optical scan machines; 
2.	 Better reporting of overvote data from counties and states (the vast majority  
of jurisdictions do not report this data); 
3.	 A mandate to investigate and address high overvote rates;
4.	 Public access to ballots and overvote data to ensure problems are addressed; and 
5.	 Better ballot design.
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Appendix A: New York Overvote Message
An “overvote” is recorded by New York’s voting machines when a voter has selected more candidates 
than allowed. Overvotes do not count. They are almost always unintentional. Under federal and New 
York law, voting machines must warn a voter if her ballot is overvoted, inform her of the consequences 
of casting a ballot with overvoted contests (her choices in those contests will not count), and give her 
an opportunity to correct her ballot to ensure all of her choices are counted.
Current New York Overvote Message: As alleged in a federal lawsuit,1 this message is full of 
election jargon and gives voters misleading cues about their options.
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Proposal for New Message: states the problem clearly and offers an explanation  
of the voter’s options.
As alleged in a federal lawsuit, NAACP New York State Conference v. New York State Board of Elections,2 the 
2010 overvote message in New York City and elsewhere in the state used election jargon (“Over Voted 
Ballot”) without explaining its meaning. It did not explain in plain language that the voter had selected 
too many candidates and that, as a result, her selections in the overvoted contests would not count unless 
the ballot was corrected. Counter-intuitively, the only way for an individual who had overvoted to correct 
the error was to select a red button marked with an “X” and labeled “Don’t Cast.” If the voter instead 
pressed the green “Accept” button, marked with a check, his or her vote in the overvoted contests would 
be voided.  
 
The State Board of Election has recently agreed to introduce a less confusing overvote message. The new 
message will use plain language, free of election jargon. It will explain that the voter filled in too many 
ovals and specify which contests are overvoted. It will also eliminate the misleading green or red colors and 
other confusing signifiers (such as check marks) that could encourage voters to cast votes that will not be 
counted.
** Note that depending on the polling place, voting machines in New York provide voters with the 
option of receiving their messages in English, Spanish, Chinese or Korean.  In 2012, certain polling 
places in Queens will also have messages available in at least one Asian Indian language as well.
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Appendix B: Overvotes in New York City Election Contests
This appendix determines the total number of overvotes in New York City for each of the seven electoral 
races other than the gubernatorial election that were contested in every precinct in the city. It uses the same 
methodology as Table 1 to estimate overvotes; see Table 1 for a more complete description of each of the 
fields in the tables below. Adding up the overvotes in all eight races, there were a total of 18,958 overvotes 
cast in the 2010 election in these eight contests. The governor’s race had the highest overvote rates of all 
eight contests considered here; the U.S. Senate two-year term election had the next highest overvote rates 
across all boroughs, while the state senate race had the lowest overvote rate among the eight contests.
•	 United States Senate (Six-Year Term) 
Observed #  
of Votes
Observed 
Overvote Rate
Total # of 
ED Votes
Estimated # of  
ED Overvotes
Bronx 172,985 0.26% 174,613 455
Brooklyn 183,200 0.12% 394,057 473
Manhattan 339,138 0.06% 341,778 208
Queens 153,849 0.10% 337,366 344
Staten Island 94,892 0.09% 94,993 87
Totals 944,064 0.10% 1,342,747 1,567
•	 United	States	Senate	(Two-Year	Term)
Observed #  
of Votes
Observed 
Overvote Rate
Total # of 
ED Votes
Estimated # of  
ED Overvotes
Bronx 172,985 0.51% 174,613 899
Brooklyn 183,200 0.22% 394,057 852
Manhattan 339,138 0.18% 341,778 620
Queens 153,849 0.24% 337,366 800
Staten Island 94,892 0.19% 94,993 179
Totals 944,064 0.26% 1,342,747 3,350
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•	 Comptroller
Observed #  
of Votes
Observed 
Overvote Rate
Total # of 
ED Votes
Estimated # of  
ED Overvotes
Bronx 172,985 0.36% 174,613 626
Brooklyn 183,200 0.12% 394,057 486
Manhattan 339,138 0.10% 341,778 351
Queens 153,849 0.12% 337,366 406
Staten Island 94,892 0.10% 94,993 97
Totals 944,064 0.16% 1,342,747 1,966
•	 Attorney General
Observed #  
of Votes
Observed 
Overvote Rate
Total # of 
ED Votes
Estimated # of  
ED Overvotes
Bronx 172,985 0.29% 174,613 511
Brooklyn 183,200 0.14% 394,057 551
Manhattan 339,138 0.08% 341,778 284
Queens 153,849 0.10% 337,366 344
Staten Island 94,892 0.11% 94,993 109
Totals 944,064 0.14% 1,342,747 1,799
•	 United	States	Representative
Observed #  
of Votes
Observed 
Overvote Rate
Total # of 
ED Votes
Estimated # of  
ED Overvotes
Bronx 172,985 0.27% 174,613 464
Brooklyn 183,200 0.07% 394,057 297
Manhattan 339,138 0.09% 341,778 321
Queens 153,849 0.11% 337,366 379
Staten Island 94,892 0.10% 94,993 99
Totals 944,064 0.13% 1,342,747 1,560
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•	 State Senate
Observed #  
of Votes
Observed 
Overvote Rate
Total # of 
ED Votes
Estimated # of  
ED Overvotes
Bronx 172,985 0.19% 174,613 336
Brooklyn 183,200 0.06% 394,057 217
Manhattan 339,138 0.05% 341,778 161
Queens 153,849 0.09% 337,366 296
Staten Island 94,892 0.02% 94,993 22
Totals 944,064 0.08% 1,342,747 1,032
•	 State Assembly
Observed # 
of Votes
Observed 
Overvote Rate
Total # of 
ED Votes
Estimated # of 
ED Overvotes
Bronx 172,985 0.32% 174,613 564
Brooklyn 183,200 0.06% 394,057 256
Manhattan 339,138 0.05% 341,778 161
Queens 153,849 0.04% 337,366 129
Staten Island 94,892 0.06% 94,993 61
Totals 944,064 0.10% 1,342,747 1,171
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Appendix C: Overvotes Rates By County in New York State
This appendix provides data on overvote rates, by county, in the 2010 gubernatorial election in New 
York. The State Board of Elections provided (or directed us to) overvote data for 34 counties; there were 
28 counties for which we were unable to obtain overvote data. The table below lists the counties for 
which information was available, along with the number of votes cast in 2010, the number of overvotes 
in the gubernatorial election, and the overvote rate; the number of overvotes recorded for the five New 
York City counties corresponds to the estimated number of overvotes in Table 1. In total, 0.40 percent 
of the ballots cast for governor in these 34 counties were overvoted. 
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Total Votes Overvotes in Governor’s Race Overvote Rate
Albany 98,918 273 0.28%
Bronx 174,613 1,572 0.90%
Broome 62,515 212 0.34%
Cayuga 21,445 82 0.38%
Chautauqua 36,390 132 0.36%
Chemung 23,621 118 0.50%
Chenango 13,349 51 0.38%
Cortland 12,802 62 0.48%
Delaware 13,161 51 0.39%
Essex 12,060 39 0.32%
Genesee 16,989 34 0.20%
Greene 15,138 90 0.59%
Hamilton 2,667 7 0.26%
Kings 394,057 2,028 0.51%
Madison 20,337 88 0.43%
New York 341,778 1,188 0.35%
Orange 94,816 389 0.41%
Orleans 11,465 34 0.30%
Oswego 29,778 118 0.40%
Putnam 28,144 74 0.26%
Queens 337,366 1,403 0.42%
Richmond 94,993 322 0.34%
Rockland 85,725 215 0.25%
Schoharie 10,649 20 0.19%
Schuyler 5,552 21 0.38%
Seneca 10,224 24 0.23%
St. Lawrence 28,282 90 0.32%
Suffolk 401,272 844 0.21%
Sullivan 21,851 22 0.10%
Tioga 16885 22 0.13%
Ulster 53,208 90 0.17%
Warren 21,716 43 0.20%
Washington 17,003 36 0.21%
Yates 7,196 53 0.74%
Totals: 2,421,133 9,669 0.40%
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Appendix D: Methodology
This appendix describes our data sources and the methodology we used to estimate the total number 
of overvotes in New York City and New York State. It also explains the ecological inference techniques 
used to estimate by-race overvote rates in each borough.
Data Sources
We obtained from the New York City Board of Elections the  machine output for precincts in each 
of the city’s five boroughs. For each election district, the output provides the number of votes cast for 
the candidates in each electoral race. The output also provides the total number of ballots cast in the 
precinct, as well as the number of undervotes – defined as the number of ballots where the voter did 
not mark a choice – and overvotes for each contest. 
To calculate the overvote rate for each contest in a precinct, we divide the number of overvotes in that 
contest by the number of votes cast in that precinct. We then determine the demographic composition 
of each precinct using race data at the Vote Tabulation District (VTD) level from the 2010 Census. 
The City Board of Elections, in providing us with the voting machine output, noted that output was 
“pre-recanvass” and “pre-certification.” There may be errors in the output that the Board of Elections 
would have subsequently corrected during the recanvass and certification process. Accordingly, the 
results in this report should be interpreted with caution. However, in analyzing the output, we found 
only one obvious irregularity: a majority of precincts in Queens and Brooklyn yielded blank output. 
As we note throughout our report, the existence of blank output in so much of the city reaffirms our 
conviction that New York City – and, indeed, election administrators throughout the rest of the state 
and country – must maintain better precinct-level data on overvoting. 
Estimating the Total Number of Overvotes
The number of machine overvotes for the entire city must be estimated, and cannot be extracted from 
the voting machine output, because the machine output is blank in many precincts. To estimate the 
total number of overvotes in the City, we multiply the observed overvote rate in each borough by the 
total number of votes cast, as reported by the New York State Board of Elections. 
Our estimate of the total number of overvotes assumes that the overvote rate is the same in precincts 
with blank voting machine output as in precincts with populated output. In reality, this probably causes 
us to substantially underestimate the total number of overvotes in the City. Because the areas of the city 
with no overvote data have higher concentrations of voting-age Hispanics and blacks than the areas 
with overvote data, and because minorities are significantly more likely to overvote than white voters, 
our estimate of over 6,500 overvotes in the governor’s contest and 19,000 across all contests is probably 
lower than the actual number of overvotes cast in the City in 2010.
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About half of New York’s counties did not produce overvote data. Several of the counties that did not 
produce such data were among those in which we might expect to see particularly large numbers of 
overvotes, including Erie, Monroe, Nassau and Westchester Counties. If we assume that the statewide 
average for overvotes was the same as New York City’s, there would have been 23,000 overvotes in the 
governor’s contest and approximately 60,000 overvoted contests in total. A more conservative estimate 
would look at counties from outside New York City that provided us with information. Using the 
overvote rate of 0.39 percent – the statewide average from the half of counties that provided information 
– we still end up with startlingly large numbers: 18,500 overvotes cast statewide in the governor’s race 
and nearly 54,000 overvoted contests in all.30 
Estimating By-Race Overvote Rates
Ecological inference is a widely accepted statistical technique used to infer individual-level behavior 
from aggregate data. The technique is commonly used in the Voting Rights Act context in order to 
determine the electoral preferences of different race groups; the analysis can ascertain, for instance, the 
fraction of blacks who voted Democrat or the fraction of whites who voted Republican. The application 
of ecological inference to overvote data is not procedurally any different: we use it to determine the 
fraction of each racial group in the five boroughs who overvoted in the gubernatorial contest. 
From the Voting Rights Act context, the most reliable court-accepted ecological inference technique 
is known as King’s EI, developed by Professor Gary King at Harvard University.31 The method has 
significant advantages over other ecological inference techniques because it is able to quantify the 
uncertainty associated with estimates and because it can be adapted to analyze areas where there are 
three racial groups of interest. We use King’s EI to calculate all by-race estimates reported above. 
It is worth noting that ecological inference is not an exact science, and no ecological inference technique 
will always provide accurate estimates. Nonetheless, the estimates provided by widely accepted ecological 
inference techniques like King’s EI have been uniformly accepted by courts as the most accurate – and 
usually the only – way to assess racial voting patterns in other voting rights contexts. There is little reason 
to believe that those techniques ought to be any less acceptable for analyzing overvoting patterns. 
It is also worth noting that ecological inference methods, like King’s EI, are usually optimally conditioned 
for analyzing patterns among two dominant racial groups, but they can be modified to apply to areas 
of interest with three racial groups. The model, however, becomes extremely complex (and inaccurate) 
when more than three racial groups are introduced; this is why Asian voters were excluded from the 
analysis. The exclusion of Asian voters might pose accuracy problems in Queens, where 22.9 percent of 
the population is Asian. The careful reader would do well to approach the overvote estimates in Queens 
with caution.
We were unable to estimate the overvote rate for Hispanics and blacks in Staten Island because King’s 
EI was unable to come up with a single estimate that respected the required mathematical bounds 
for the overvote rate. We suspect that because overvote rates are usually so small, King’s EI requires 
more information from the data than it does in its usual Voting Rights Act applications in order to 
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make inferences about overvote rates. Together with the relatively small black and Hispanic voting-age 
population in Staten Island, the low levels of turnout among blacks and Hispanics on Staten Island 
suggest that there were not enough actual black and Hispanic voters in Staten Island for King’s EI to 
accurately estimate the overvote rates for these two groups.
The table below displays the by-race overvote estimates for each borough in New York City; the estimates 
in red were reported in Table 7. The numbers in parentheses represent the bounds of the 95 percent 
confidence interval for each estimate. 
White Black Hispanic
Bronx 0.55% (0.11, 0.95) 1.08% (1.01, 1.14) 1.28% (1.13, 1.44)
Brooklyn 0.35% (0.28, 0.41) 0.63% (0.55, 0.70) 1.37% (0.80, 1.82)
Manhattan 0.20% (0.16, 0.27) 0.82% (0.54, 1.08) 0.91% (0.79, 1.02)
Queens 0.24% (0.18, 0.30) 0.64% (0.12, 1.25) 1.37% (1.30, 1.48)
Staten Island 0.21% (0.16,0.28) *** ***
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Appendix E: Cuyahoga County Ballot, November 2
Poorly worded 
instructions in the 
governor’s contest 
may have caused 
some voters to believe 
they could vote 
for more than one 
candidate.
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Appendix F: Overvoting in Cities of Cuyahoga County in Gubernatorial Election of 
2010, Analysis by Professor David C. Kimball, University of Missouri-St. Louis
The graph below shows the overvote rate by the percentage of black voters in each of the 58 cities in 
Cuyahoga County. The size of each circle is in proportion to the number of voters in each city. The 
graph shows that the overvote rate is higher in largely African-American cities.
The relationship between race and overvotes holds even when controlling for the residual vote rate in 
the 2006 gubernatorial election. For each 10% increase in the African-American percentage of voters 
in a city, the overvote rate increases, on average, 0.1 percentage points.
For each 10% increase in the Hispanic percentage of voters in a city, the overvote rate increases, on 
average, 0.05 percentage points. Both of these effects are statistically significant.
Homogeneous City Analysis
•	In cities that are more than 80% African-American, the overvote rate is 1.3% (2 cities).
•	In cities that are less than 20% African-American, the overvote rate is 0.4% (43 cities).
•	In cities that are more than 90% African-American, the overvote rate is 1.3% (2 cities).
•	In cities that are less than 10% African-American, the overvote rate is 0.4% (39 cities).
Ecological Regression Estimates 
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•	Estimated Election Day overvote rate for African-American voters: 1.1% 
•	Estimated Election Day overvote rate for non-African-American voters: 0.4% 
Ecological Inference Estimates 
•	Estimated Election Day overvote rate for African-American voters: 1.3% 
•	Estimated Election Day overvote rate for non-African-American voters: 0.4% 
Meanwhile, there is little relationship between race and undervotes in the 2010 gubernatorial election 
(see figure below).
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